Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 1 of 23
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MAY 2 7 2025
AUSTIN DIVISION
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT CLERK
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BY
CR
DEPUTY
MARKUS GLODEK,
Plaintiff,
V.
Case No.:
CITY OF AUSTIN,
1 s25 CV00810 ADA
OMER AHMAD AND
PAUL MURRAY,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Markus Glodek brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for fabrication of
evidence and defamation against the City of Austin, Officer Omer Ahmad and Officer Paul
Murray, alleging as follows:
PARTIES
1.
Plaintiff is a resident of San Francisco, California. He resided in Austin, Texas at
the time of the events and omissions giving rise to his claims.
2.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Omer Ahmad is a police officer with the
Austin Police Department (APD). He is sued in his individual capacity for compensatory and
punitive damages. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of law as an APD officer.
Service may be effected at Austin Police Department, 715 E. 8th Street, Austin, TX 78701.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 2 of 23
3.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Paul Murray is a police officer with the
APD. He is sued in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages. At all
relevant times, he was acting under color of law as an APD officer. Service may be effected at
Austin Police Department, 715 E. 8th Street, Austin, TX 78701.
4.
Defendant City of Austin is a municipality that operates the APD and employed
Defendants Ahmad and Murray at all relevant times. Service may be effected by serving its
mayor, Kirk Watson, at 301 W 2nd St, Austin, TX 78701, under the authority of Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 17.024(b).
JURISDICTION & VENUE
5.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as
this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6.
This Court has general personal jurisdiction over the City of Austin, which is
located in Travis County within the Western District of Texas. Upon information and belief, this
Court also has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants Ahmad and Murray, who reside,
work, or are otherwise located in Travis County.
7.
This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over all Defendants, as Plaintiff's
claims arise from conduct by Defendants that occurred in Travis County.
8.
Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
because a substantial portion of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims
occurred in Travis County.
2
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 3 of 23
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
Plaintiff's Arrest, Imprisonment and Prosecution
9.
On June 19, 2024, Officers Ahmad and Murray responded to a 911 call placed by
Plaintiff's wife. They encountered Plaintiff outside the apartment building in which he and his
wife lived together. Plaintiff was peaceful and collaborative and offered to speak with the
officers about what had happened.
10.
The officers placed Plaintiff in handcuffs almost immediately. He was fully
cooperative and complied with all instructions. He directed the officers to the apartment so they
could speak with his wife.
11.
Officer Ahmad went to Plaintiff's apartment and spoke with Plaintiff's wife.
Officer Murray remained outside and interviewed Plaintiff until Officer Ahmad returned.
12.
At some point during Plaintiff's conversation with police, either before or after
Officer Ahmad had returned from speaking with Plaintiff's wife, Plaintiff was informed that he
was being placed under arrest.
13.
The officers indicated to Plaintiff that they had to arrest him because the policies
under which they operated were, in their words, "really strict". The officers also discussed with
one another concerns about "liability."
14.
Officer Ahmad transported Plaintiff to Travis County Jail. Officer Murray
remained at the scene and conducted an extended follow-up interview with Plaintiff's wife.
3
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 4 of 23
15.
All interactions between Plaintiff and Officers Murray and Ahmad, as well as all
interactions between Plaintiff's wife and Officers Murray and Ahmad, were recorded on police
body cameras.
16.
Officer Ahmad executed a sworn probable cause affidavit that he and Officer
Murray prepared together, with Officer Murray supplying information for inclusion. This
affidavit was used to charge Plaintiff with a misdemeanor described therein as "Assault with
Injury Family Violence."
17.
The affidavit states that Plaintiff "did admit to hitting" his wife, that he "said that
she never used force against him" and that "both parties confirmed Markus was the only one
being physical."
18.
These statements in the affidavit are false. Plaintiff did not tell the officers that he
hit his wife, did not "admit" to doing so, did not say that she never used force against him, and
did not say that he was the only one being physical. The body cam footage reflects what Plaintiff
actually said, which is inconsistent with some of the statements attributed to him in the affidavit.
Among other things, Plaintiff told the officers that he did not hurt his wife.
19.
The affidavit also states that Plaintiff's wife "said she fell to the ground," that she
"said she developed a headache due to the arguing," and that she "had a complaint of pain due to
Markus physically assaulting" her.
20.
Upon information and belief, these statements are false or misleading due to
material omissions. Plaintiff's wife did not tell the officers that she fell to the ground. Both she
and Plaintiff independently told the officers that her headache was due to a cold. She tried to
4
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 5 of 23
convey to police that she did not experience pain other than from that headache. At one point,
she tried to clarify to police that "hit" was not an accurate description of what had occurred. The
body cam footage captures a full account of what she actually said.
21.
The affidavit completely omits Plaintiff's account of events that he gave to the
officers.
22.
The affidavit does correctly state that Plaintiff's wife "was not observed to have
physical injury".
23.
Plaintiff was imprisoned for three days. At some point, he was taken to a judicial
proceeding that he now understands to have been a magistration. Plaintiff had, prior to the
magistration, repeatedly requested opportunity to contact an attorney but was not given such
opportunity, so he had to participate in the magistration without counsel to assist him. The
probable cause affidavit was not presented to Plaintiff either prior to or during the proceeding.
Because he was not aware of the affidavit's existence or contents, Plaintiff could not alert the
magistrate that it contained false and misleading statements and material omissions. It was
therefore not possible for Plaintiff to request that the affidavit be scrutinized, compared to the
body cam footage, and corrected before being used to charge him.
24.
The magistrate informed Plaintiff that an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) was
being imposed and gave Plaintiff an oral summary of the order. Plaintiff was told to sign the
order but was not given an opportunity to review or read it, and was not provided with a copy.
5
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 6 of 23
25.
Plaintiff's prosecution lasted more than nine months, from June 2024 through the
end of March 2025. For the first five weeks, the EPO barred him from coming within 200 yards
of his home.
26.
Two days after Plaintiff's arrest, his wife visited the Travis County Attorney's
Office and spoke in person with a staff member. She explained that she had sustained no physical
injuries as a result of the incident and asked the staff member to observe that she had no visible
injuries.
27.
On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff's wife executed an affidavit of non-prosecution, which
Plaintiff's attorneys submitted to the prosecutor assigned to the case approximately ten days
later. In the affidavit, she stated in relevant part:
"During this incident I did not sustain any injuries and I did not experience any pain
whatsoever as a result of the incident. Markus did not physically hurt me. I was surprised
that Markus was arrested, and I objected to Markus' arrest. I did not intend for Markus to
be arrested when I called for police assistance and I specifically asked the officers on-
scene not to arrest him. I fear that my account of what happened was partly
misinterpreted by the Austin police."
She also stated in the affidavit:
"It is my wish that all charges in relation to this matter be dismissed, all protective orders
and bond conditions that prevent him from coming home be rescinded, and that no further
action be taken."
28.
On or about July 19, 2024, Plaintiff's wife spoke with the prosecutor assigned to
the case. She explained that she had not sustained any injuries or experienced any pain as a result
of the incident, clarified again that the headache mentioned in the arrest affidavit was due to a
cold, and expressed her wish that the case be dismissed. The prosecutor indicated that she was
inclined to dismiss the charges but stated that she first needed to review evidence.
6
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 7 of 23
29.
Throughout the prosecution, Plaintiff's wife continued to reach out to her point of
contact at the Travis County Attorney's Office, the same staff member she had initially spoken
with in person, to reiterate that she had not sustained any injury or experienced any pain as a
result of the incident.
30.
Plaintiff's attorneys requested discovery, including body cam videos, on or about
June 26, 2024. One such video was made available to them sometime between November 18 and
December 5, 2024. This video documented only a portion of the interactions between Plaintiff
and his wife and the Defendant officers. Plaintiff was informed that two additional videos existed
but that his attorneys were unable to access them due to technical issues. As of February 11,
2025, these videos had not yet been received.
31.
On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff's wife emailed her contact at the Travis County
Attorney's Office to ask whether she could view the body cam footage of her own interactions
with police. In response to that inquiry, the Travis County Attorney's Office indicated that the
remaining videos had now been made available to Plaintiff's attorneys, who shortly thereafter
confirmed receipt. These videos now showed all interactions between Plaintiff and the officers,
as well as all interactions between Plaintiff's wife and the officers.
32.
The first pretrial conference following disclosure of the full body cam footage was
scheduled for March 31, 2025. Plaintiff understood that the videos would be discussed at that
conference by his attorneys and the prosecutor. The charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on
that day.
7
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 8 of 23
II.
The City of Austin's Policies and Customs
33.
The City of Austin, acting through the APD, has policies and customs that direct
officers responding to incidents involving suspected family violence to omit, with reckless
disregard for the truth, information from probable cause affidavits that any reasonable person
would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to their attention, thereby violating the
rights of arrestees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
34.
Section 418.2.2 of the Austin Police Department General Orders (hereinafter, the
"General Orders") provides as follows:
"418.2.2 ARREST PC AFFIDAVITS FOR FAMILY VIOLENCE RELATED ASSAULTS
(a) Arrest affidavits for family violence assaults shall be limited to information that is
necessary to establish probable cause. Officers shall refrain from copying and pasting
their incident report into the arrest affidavit. It is not necessary to include the primary
aggressor's account of events within the arrest affidavit, unless such inclusion is
necessary to establish probable cause."
The term "primary aggressor" is defined in Section 418.1.1 of the General Orders as
"[t]he person who appears to be the most significant aggressor rather than the first
aggressor. In identifying the primary aggressor an officer shall consider:
(a) The intent of the law to protect victims of family violence from continuing
abuse,
(b) The threats creating fear of physical injury,
(c) The history of family violence between the persons involved, and
(d) Whether either person acted in self-defense."
35.
Section 418.2.2(a) requires that affidavits "shall be limited" to information
necessary to "establish" probable cause. This language directs police officers to omit from
affidavits any information that would tend to negate the existence of probable cause, as well as
any other information not strictly necessary to establish it - and it does so without exception,
8
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 9 of 23
even where a reasonable person would know that a magistrate would wish to have such
information brought to their attention, and where omission would constitute reckless disregard
for the truth. As such, the policy directs APD officers, whenever the information it requires them
to omit is material, to violate the constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
36.
Section 418.2.2(a) also states that "[i]t is not necessary to include the primary
aggressor's account of events within the arrest affidavit, unless such inclusion is necessary to
establish probable cause." This clause misinstructs officers that, once a person has been labeled a
"primary aggressor," the officer may, unless it supports probable cause, completely omit that
person's account from the affidavit. As such, the policy misstates officers' constitutional
obligations, which require officers to include in their affidavits information that a reasonable
person would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to their attention, or the omission
of which would constitute reckless disregard for the truth, regardless of whether the source has
been labeled a "primary aggressor." The City of Austin and the APD are deliberately indifferent
to the fact that officers trained under the APD's policy will predictably and routinely submit
affidavits that conceal material information from magistrates, resulting in violations of the
constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
37.
The requirement in Section 418.2.2(a) that officers omit information from
affidavits applies even where the omitted information would show that statements included in the
affidavit are false. Any reasonable person would know that a magistrate would wish to be alerted
to the falsity of material statements presented to them, so omissions of this type inevitably
constitute reckless disregard for the truth. By instructing officers to exclude information that
9
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 10 of 23
does not help establish probable cause - even when that information would have exposed false
or misleading statements included in the affidavit - the policy ensures that those statements
remain uncorrected and are used to charge arrestees, in violation of their constitutional due
process rights.
38.
Section 418.2.2(a) instructs officers to determine whose account of events may,
according to the APD's policies, be omitted from an affidavit by identifying a "primary
aggressor." The policy defines that term to mean "the most significant aggressor," not necessarily
the first, and directs officers to consider a set of subjective factors unrelated to whether a
person's account is credible, material, or trustworthy. It imposes no obligation on officers to
explain to the magistrate how the designation was made or what criteria were used. As a result,
the magistrate has no way to assess whether the omission of the person's account was based on
considerations such as credibility or materiality and, in fact, has no reason to believe that it was.
Because the criteria actually used in making the designation remain unreported and obscure, the
determination may in practice be arbitrary or reflect illicit bias. Yet under APD policy, that
designation - made without regard to credibility or materiality - will result by default in the
arrestee's account being omitted from the affidavit. That affidavit then becomes the basic
narrative presented to the magistrate, used to charge the arrestee, and likely to shape the direction
of the prosecution and legal process that follows.
39.
The APD, by instructing officers through Section 418.2.2(a) to manipulate which
information to include in affidavits in ways that will obviously and frequently result in material
information being concealed from magistrates, thereby communicates to officers that, in
10
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 11 of 23
connection with family violence allegations, it does not place value on officers preparing
affidavits that are not misleading. Indeed, Section 418.2.2(a) signals to officers that, in such
cases, they are at times expected to produce misleading affidavits, even when this violates the
constitutional rights of arrestees. The APD's message through this policy - that officers are
expected to sculpt affidavits that omit information that could lessen the likelihood of charges
even when such information is material and the affidavit thereby becomes misleading -
predictably leads not only to omission, but also to exaggeration and fabrication. The City of
Austin and the APD are deliberately indifferent to the fact that this policy will predictably result
in a pattern of misleading, exaggerated, and fabricated statements being included in affidavits,
and to the resulting violations of the constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
40.
By directing officers to omit from affidavits any information that does not help
establish probable cause - including facts that would negate it - Section 418.2.2(a) also
instructs officers how to assess probable cause in the first place. Officers understand that
affidavits must communicate all known material facts that a magistrate needs in order to
determine whether or not probable cause existed. Telling officers to always exclude facts that
would tend to negate the existence of probable cause from their communication to the magistrate
is to instruct them that such facts are not part of the probable cause determination - not for the
magistrate, and not for the officer - and should therefore not only be omitted from the affidavit
but also be disregarded by the officer in making their initial determination of probable cause at
the time of the arrest. As such, the APD's policy misinstructs officers by misconstruing their
constitutional obligations, which require officers to assess whether probable cause exists by
11
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 12 of 23
considering the totality of facts known to them, including those that cut against probable cause.
Section 418.2.2(a) will thus lead to arrests in situations where the totality of known facts does
not support the existence of probable cause, in violation of the constitutional rights of arrestees.
41.
In fact, there are situations in which APD policies require officers to make arrests
and file charges even when they correctly believe that the totality of facts known to them does
not support probable cause for the charge. Section 418.2.1 of the APD's General Orders reads as
follows:
"418.2.1 ARREST REQUIREMENT FOR ASSAULTIVE OFFENSES
(a) Officers are required to make an arrest for incidents involving family violence when:
1. An assault has occurred that resulted in a minimum of bodily injury or
complaint of pain; or where an officer can articulate facts from which a reasonable
person could infer that the victim would have felt pain due to:
(a) The manner in which the suspect made contact with the victim, or
(b) the nature of observable physical marks on the victim's body allegedly
caused by the suspect's contact with the victim, and
2. The suspect is still on-scene; and
3. The assault meets the definition of "family violence" or "dating violence."
42.
Section 418.2.1 requires arrests in situations where "an assault has occurred," but
it provides no guidance as to how officers are meant to determine whether this condition is met.
A reasonable officer trying to make sense of the policy will likely conclude that "an assault has
occurred" is shorthand for "there is probable cause to arrest for assault", and thus read Section
418.2.1 together with the APD's policies regarding probable cause in Section 418.2.2(a). As a
result, the officer will deploy the conception of probable cause communicated by Section
12
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 13 of 23
418.2.2(a), under which facts that would tend to negate probable cause are disregarded. The
officer will thus interpret the phrase "an assault has occurred" to mean that there exists some
basis to infer probable cause, such as the mere fact that an allegation has been made, while
disregarding any contrary facts known to them.
43.
Section 418.2.1, read together with Section 418.2.2(a), will at times require
officers to make arrests and file charges even when the officer believes that the totality of facts
known to them does not support probable cause for these charges. Consider for example a
situation in which a person who appears uninjured tells an officer that a suspect "hit" them, but
also says that it was not a "real" hitting and credibly communicates that they did not feel any
pain or sustain any injury. The officer may reasonably conclude - based on the person's own
account and their own observations - that no assault with injury occurred, and that the totality
of facts known to them does not support probable cause for that charge. Nonetheless, because
Section 418.2.2(a) directs the officer to disregard facts that would cut against probable cause
when making the probable cause determination, the officer must treat the incident as one in
which "an assault has occurred." And because, given that the word "hit" has been used, the
officer "can articulate facts from which a reasonable person could infer that the victim would
have felt pain due to [...] [t]he manner in which the suspect made contact with the victim,"
Section 418.2.1(a)(1) requires the officer to make an arrest.
44.
The officer is then instructed by Section 418.2.2(a) to omit from the arrest
affidavit any facts that do not help establish probable cause. As a result, although the officer
knows that the alleged victim did not feel pain, the officer will be required to exclude the facts -
13
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 14 of 23
such as the alleged victim's own statements - that form the basis for that knowledge. On the
other hand, the officer is instructed to include any "facts from which a reasonable person could
infer that the victim would have felt pain" because such facts tend to establish probable cause.
The affidavit will therefore present a version of events from which it could be concluded that the
victim experienced pain, while omitting the facts that the officer knows show that no pain
occurred. The result is an affidavit that supports an "assault with injury" charge. The arrestee will
therefore be charged with assault with injury, even though the arresting officer correctly believed
that the totality of facts known to them did not support probable cause for that charge, in
violation of the arrestee's constitutional rights. This unconstitutional outcome is a direct result of
the interplay between Section 418.2.1, which requires arrest, and Section 418.2.2(a), which
determines what facts will be included in the affidavit.
45.
A policy that requires officers to make arrests and file charges whenever they
determine - based on the totality of facts known to them - that probable cause for the charges
exists would not be constitutionally objectionable. But the City of Austin's policies do something
else. They direct officers to use, in cases that involve allegations of family violence, a modified
policy-driven conception of probable cause, one that instructs officers to disregard facts that
would cut against probable cause when making their probable cause determination and to omit
such facts from their arrest affidavits. Section 418.2.2(a) imposes this altered framework, and
Section 418.2.1 then requires arrests based on it.
46.
Adopting policies that supplant the constitutional conception of probable cause
with a modified conception of the City's own making is not permissible. The Constitution
14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 15 of 23
requires probable cause determinations in connection with warrantless arrests to be purely fact-
based undertakings to be made in light of the totality of known circumstances and informed by
the officer's experience and judgment. Municipalities may not modify this conception of
probable cause for certain categories of arrests based on policy considerations. By instructing
officers to apply an altered pre-scripted conception of probable cause for cases involving
allegations of family violence - one that is inconsistent with the totality-of-circumstances
framework required under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments - the City of Austin violates
the constitutional rights of arrestees.
47. Through Section 418.2.2(a), the APD communicates to its officers that, in
connection with cases involving allegations of family violence, it wants "probable cause" to
mean something different from what it means under the U.S. Constitution. The altered
framework sends a clear message that, in this category of cases, constitutional standards are
secondary to internal policy, which predictably leads to a broader range of constitutional
violations. Officers who are compelled to make arrests in situations where they believe that the
totality of known facts may not support probable cause will predictably feel pressed to justify
such arrests by drafting affidavits that distort the underlying facts. This predictably results in
affidavits that are misleading or contain material omissions, exaggerations, or outright
falsehoods, in direct violation of the constitutional rights of arrestees.
48. Upon information and belief, the City of Austin does not adequately train,
supervise, or discipline APD officers to ensure compliance with their constitutional obligations.
By failing to discipline officers who violate these obligations, the City ratifies such misconduct
15
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 16 of 23
and signals institutional acceptance. The City of Austin is deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional harms that predictably result.
49.
Upon information and belief, there are cases in which APD officers have stated
that they believed that under the APD's policies they had no choice but to make an arrest in
connection with an allegation of family violence, even when they did not believe that the alleged
assault had in fact occurred.
50.
Section 418 has, upon information and belief, been the grounds for multiple APD
disciplinary actions alleging non-compliance by APD officers. The risk of being subjected to
such disciplinary action places pressure on officers to follow Section 418 strictly, even when
doing so requires them to violate the constitutional rights of arrestees.
51.
Upon information and belief, charges relating to family violence are dismissed by
the Travis County Attorney's Office at a higher rate than other types of charges.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process
Through Fabrication of Evidence)
Against All Defendants
52.
Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.
53.
Officers Ahmad and Murray fabricated evidence by knowingly including material
false and misleading statements in the sworn probable cause affidavit used to charge Plaintiff,
16
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 17 of 23
and by omitting material information known to them that would have corrected, contradicted, or
contextualized those statements and prevented them from being misleading.
54.
In arresting Plaintiff and deciding what statements to include and what
information to omit from the arrest affidavit, the choices made by Officers Ahmad and Murray
were directed by their conscious attempt to conform their conduct to the policies and customs of
the APD, including Section 418 of the General Orders. This is evidenced by the officers'
statements to Plaintiff that they had to arrest him because the policies under which they were
operating were "really strict," and their discussions among themselves of "liability," which
Plaintiff understood as concern about liability for failing to comply with departmental policy. It
is further evidenced by the officers' complete omission of Plaintiff's account of events and other
material information that would have negated probable cause, in direct alignment with the APD's
instructions in Section 418.2.2(a), as well as by the affidavit's use of the conclusory phrase
"complaint of pain," which directly copies language from the APD's policy and suggests that the
policy was directly consulted during the drafting process.
55.
Officers are constitutionally required to include in arrest affidavits any material
information that a reasonable person would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to
their attention - especially when such information would reveal that a statement already
included in the affidavit is false or misleading. But Section 418.2.2(a) tells officers to do the
opposite: to omit information unless it helps establish probable cause, even when it would
correct a material falsehood or prevent the magistrate from being materially misled. That is
exactly what happened here: as directed by the APD's policy, the officers withheld information
17
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 18 of 23
that they knew would have exposed material errors and omissions in the affidavit used to charge
Plaintiff.
56.
As previously described, the APD's policy framework - including Sections
418.2.2(a) and 418.2.1 - not only directs officers to omit material information from affidavits,
but also predictably results in affidavits that include misleading statements, exaggerations, or
fabrications, as officers attempt to justify arrests that internal policy requires them to make and
the APD's written policies communicate to officers that, in cases involving allegations of family
violence, affidavits are not expected to be non-misleading. That is what occurred here. The
affidavit used to charge Plaintiff contains a number of misleading, conclusory, and false
statements which, as indicated by the one-sided nature of the omissions and distortions it
presents, are a predictable result of the APD's policies and customs.
57.
But for the City of Austin's policies and customs, the false and misleading
statements in Plaintiff's arrest affidavit would either not have been included, or would have been
accompanied by truthful information that would have exposed them as false or misleading. Had
that occurred, these statements could not have been used to charge and prosecute Plaintiff. The
City's unconstitutional policies, customs, and training were thus the proximate cause and moving
force behind the use of these false and misleading statements in Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution.
The City of Austin is therefore, together with the other Defendants, liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violating Plaintiff's clearly established rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
18
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 19 of 23
58.
Upon information and belief, the offense report in Plaintiff's case replicates all or
most of the false and misleading statements from the arrest affidavit.
59. These false and misleading statements were used to deprive Plaintiff of liberty and
property by imprisoning Plaintiff for several days, imposing an EPO that barred him from his
home for over a month, and by prosecuting Plaintiff for over nine months. Had these false and
misleading statements not been used against Plaintiff, it is likely that one or more of the
following would have occurred: Plaintiff would not have been charged at all, his imprisonment
would have been shorter, no EPO would have been imposed or its duration would have been
shorter, and at a minimum the duration of his prosecution would have been significantly reduced.
60. The false and misleading statements in the affidavit were of a kind that would
almost certainly have influenced a jury's verdict. The false claim that Plaintiff "did admit to
hitting" his wife attributes to him a statement that amounts, in both form and content, to a
confession. If this fabricated confession, combined with the other false and misleading
statements in the affidavit, had been introduced at trial, this would have significantly increased
the likelihood that a jury would have falsely convicted Plaintiff.
61.
The emotional distress that Plaintiff experienced as a result of his imprisonment
and prosecution was significantly exacerbated by the knowledge that the affidavit used to charge
him included material falsehoods and statements that were materially misleading. Their inclusion
signaled that, from the outset, the legal process instituted against Plaintiff would be
fundamentally dishonest. Until the body cam videos were made available, which took nearly
eight months, Plaintiff had to live with the likelihood that these statements would go uncorrected,
19
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 20 of 23
be replicated in other official documents, and be used at trial to secure a false conviction. He also
had to reckon with the possibility that additional fabrications might be introduced. This caused a
level of fear and distress that would not have existed had these false and misleading statements
not been used against him.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Defamation Plus Deprivation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process)
Against All Defendants
62.
Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.
63.
Defendant officers knowingly included in their probable cause affidavit the false
written statement that Plaintiff "did admit to hitting" his wife. This statement is of a kind that is
inherently harmful to reputation and as such constitutes defamation per se under general
principles of defamation law.
64.
Upon information and belief, the defamatory statement was replicated in the
offense report that the officer Defendants prepared in connection with Plaintiff's case. The
probable cause affidavit was provided to the magistrate and the prosecutor, and the offense report
was provided to the prosecutor.
65.
The affidavit containing the defamatory statement was published on the Travis
County District Clerk's website, where it remains publicly available and downloadable.
20
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 21 of 23
Members of the public who search for Plaintiff's name online are easily able to find, access and
read the statement.
66.
The defamatory statement, both by itself and combined with the other false and
misleading assertions in the affidavit, has injured and continues to injure Plaintiff's reputation,
causing Plaintiff to incur damages.
67.
The defamatory statement was used, together with the other false and misleading
assertions in the affidavit, to charge and prosecute Plaintiff, depriving him of liberty and property
in violation of his constitutional rights as described above.
68.
As explained above, but for the City of Austin's policies and customs, the false
and misleading statements in Plaintiff's arrest affidavit - including the false claim that Plaintiff
"did admit to hitting" his wife - would either not have been included in the affidavit, or would
have been accompanied by truthful information that would have exposed them as false or
misleading. Had that occurred, these statements could not have injured Plaintiff's reputation or
been used to charge and prosecute him. The City's unconstitutional policies, customs, and
training were the proximate cause and moving force behind the publication of these false and
misleading statements and the resulting injury to Plaintiff's reputation, and their use in depriving
Plaintiff of liberty and property. The City of Austin is therefore, together with the other
Defendants, liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the defamation and the constitutional harms
Plaintiff experienced as a result of the publication and use of these false and misleading
statements, in violation of his clearly established rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
21
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 1
Filed 05/27/25
Page 22 of 23
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Plaintiff seeks all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against all Defendants as follows:
a.
Awarding general and/or compensatory damages in an amount to be
determined at trial for all injuries suffered as a result of Defendants'
wrongdoing;
b.
Awarding punitive damages against the individual Defendants to the extent
permitted by law;
C.
Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum legal
rate;
d.
Awarding the costs of suit as incurred in this action and attorneys' fees;
and
e.
Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and
proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
22
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 1 Filed 05/27/25 Page 23 of 23
Date: May 22, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
Markus Markus Glodek Glodek
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Tel.: 737-999-1508
Email: mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
Plaintiff, Pro Se
23
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 2 Filed 05/27/25 Page 1 of 2
FILED
February 27, 2025
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BY:
Alicia Davis
AUSTIN DIVISION
DEPUTY
§
IN RE: COURT DOCKET
§
MANAGEMENT
§
§
§
FOR AUSTIN DIVISION
§
§
MAGISTRATE REFERRAL ORDER
Under Rule 1 of the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate
Judges, Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall refer all civil
matters assigned to the Honorable Alan D Albright to a United States Magistrate Judge for the
Austin Division, allocated pursuant to the Clerk of the Court's standard procedure, except the
following:
Cases brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, and 2255;
Cases brought by detainees and prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 430 U.S. 388 (1971);
Cases brought under 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (patent cases);
Cases designated as "830 Patent" and "835 Patent (ANDA)"; and
Cases that include ex parte applications for temporary restraining orders.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall refer all criminal matters
for the Austin Division assigned to the Honorable Alan D Albright to a United States Magistrate
Judge for the Austin Division, allocated pursuant to the Clerk of the Court's standard procedure.
The matters are referred for disposition of all non-dispositive pretrial matters as provided in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and for findings and recommendations on all case-dispositive motions as
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 2 Filed 05/27/25 Page 2 of 2
SIGNED this 27th day of February, 2025.
UNITED ALAN Olan D STATES ALBRIGHT DISTRICT JUDGE
2
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 3 Filed 05/28/25 Page 1 of 3
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
)
)
)
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff(s)
)
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25CV00810
)
City of Austin,
)
ADF
Omer Ahmad and
)
Paul Murray
)
Defendant(s)
)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address)
City of Austin
c/o Mayor Kirk Watson
301 W 2nd St
Austin, TX 78701
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) - or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) - you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney,
whose name and address are:
Markus Glodek
Pro Se
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Tel.: 737-999-1508
Email: mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT, PHILIP J. DEVLIN
Date: 5/28/2025
Cm
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
COURT
INSURANCE OF
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 3 Filed 05/28/25 Page 2 of 3
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
)
)
)
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff(s)
)
)
V.
Civil Action No.
)
1:25CV00810
)
ADV
City of Austin,
)
Omer Ahmad and
)
Paul Murray
)
Defendant(s)
)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address)
Omer Ahmad
c/o Austin Police Department
715 E. 8th Street
Austin, TX 78701
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) - or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) - you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney,
whose name and address are:
Markus Glodek
Pro Se
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Tel.: 737-999-1508
Email: mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT, PHILIP J. DEVLIN
Date: 5/28/2025
Cm Ton Rn
WINTERY COURT
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
DISTRICT
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 3 Filed 05/28/25 Page 3 of 3
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
)
)
)
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff(s)
)
)
V.
Civil Action No.
)
1 & 25CV00810
)
ADV
City of Austin,
)
Omer Ahmad and
)
Paul Murray
)
Defendant(s)
)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant's name and address)
Paul Murray
c/o Austin Police Department
715 E. 8th Street
Austin, TX 78701
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) - or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) - you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney,
whose name and address are:
Markus Glodek
Pro Se
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Tel.: 737-999-1508
Email: mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT, PHILIP J. DEVLIN
Date: 5/28/2025
Con Rry
DISTRICTION
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
MENTERS DISTRICT
AO 398 (Rev. 01/09) Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00810
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad and Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT AND REQUEST TO WAIVE SERVICE OF A SUMMONS
To: Paul Murray
(Name of the defendant or - if the defendant is a corporation, partnership, or association - an officer or agent authorized to receive service)
Why are you getting this?
A lawsuit has been filed against you, or the entity you represent, in this court under the number shown above.
A copy of the complaint is attached.
This is not a summons, or an official notice from the court. It is a request that, to avoid expenses, you waive formal
service of a summons by signing and returning the enclosed waiver. To avoid these expenses, you must return the signed
waiver within 30 days (give at least 30 days, or at least 60 days if the defendant is outside any judicial district of the United States)
from the date shown below, which is the date this notice was sent. Two copies of the waiver form are enclosed, along with
a stamped, self-addressed envelope or other prepaid means for returning one copy. You may keep the other copy.
What happens next?
If you return the signed waiver, I will file it with the court. The action will then proceed as if you had been served
on the date the waiver is filed, but no summons will be served on you and you will have 60 days from the date this notice
is sent (see the date below) to answer the complaint (or 90 days if this notice is sent to you outside any judicial district of
the United States).
If you do not return the signed waiver within the time indicated, I will arrange to have the summons and complaint
served on you. And I will ask the court to require you, or the entity you represent, to pay the expenses of making service.
Please read the enclosed statement about the duty to avoid unnecessary expenses.
I certify that this request is being sent to you on the date below.
Date:
06/03/2025
Signature Markus of the attorney Covek unrepresented
or party
Markus Glodek
Printed name
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Address
mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
E-mail address
737-999-1508
Telephone number
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00810
Citv of Austin, Omer Ahmad and Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
To: Markus Glodek
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,
two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's
jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within
60 days from
06/03/2025
, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the
United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
Date:
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
Paul Murray
Printed name of party waiving service of summons
Printed name
Address
E-mail address
Telephone number
Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons
and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in
the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
"Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has
no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of
a summons or of service.
If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff
and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
Western District of Texas
Markus Glodek
)
Plaintiff
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00810
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad and Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
To: Markus Glodek
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,
two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's
jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within
60 days from
06/03/2025
, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the
United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
Date:
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
Paul Murray
Printed name of party waiving service of summons
Printed name
Address
E-mail address
Telephone number
Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons
and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in
the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
"Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has
no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of
a summons or of service.
If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff
and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 1 of 23
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED
AUSTIN DIVISION
June 02, 2025
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARKUS GLODEK,
BY:
Christian Rodriguez
DEPUTY
Plaintiff,
V.
Case No.:
CITY OF AUSTIN,
1:25-cv-00810
OMER AHMAD AND
PAUL MURRAY,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Markus Glodek brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for fabrication of
evidence and defamation against the City of Austin, Officer Omer Ahmad and Officer Paul
Murray, alleging as follows:
PARTIES
1.
Plaintiff is a resident of San Francisco, California. He resided in Austin, Texas at
the time of the events and omissions giving rise to his claims.
2.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Omer Ahmad is a police officer with the
Austin Police Department (APD). He is sued in his individual capacity for compensatory and
punitive damages. At all relevant times, he was acting under color of law as an APD officer.
Service may be effected at Austin Police Department, 715 E. 8th Street, Austin, TX 78701.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 2 of 23
3.
Upon information and belief, Defendant Paul Murray is a police officer with the
APD. He is sued in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages. At all
relevant times, he was acting under color of law as an APD officer. Service may be effected at
Austin Police Department, 715 E. 8th Street, Austin, TX 78701.
4.
Defendant City of Austin is a municipality that operates the APD and employed
Defendants Ahmad and Murray at all relevant times. Service may be effected by serving its
mayor, Kirk Watson, at 301 W 2nd St, Austin, TX 78701, under the authority of Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 17.024(b).
JURISDICTION & VENUE
5.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as
this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6.
This Court has general personal jurisdiction over the City of Austin, which is
located in Travis County within the Western District of Texas. Upon information and belief, this
Court also has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants Ahmad and Murray, who reside,
work, or are otherwise located in Travis County.
7.
This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over all Defendants, as Plaintiff's
claims arise from conduct by Defendants that occurred in Travis County.
8.
Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
because a substantial portion of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims
occurred in Travis County.
2
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 3 of 23
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
Plaintiff's Arrest, Imprisonment and Prosecution
9.
On June 19, 2024, Officers Ahmad and Murray responded to a 911 call placed by
Plaintiff's wife. They encountered Plaintiff outside the apartment building in which he and his
wife lived together. Plaintiff was peaceful and collaborative and offered to speak with the
officers about what had happened.
10.
The officers placed Plaintiff in handcuffs almost immediately. He was fully
cooperative and complied with all instructions. He directed the officers to the apartment so they
could speak with his wife.
11.
Officer Ahmad went to Plaintiff's apartment and spoke with Plaintiff's wife.
Officer Murray remained outside and interviewed Plaintiff until Officer Ahmad returned.
12.
At some point during Plaintiff's conversation with police, either before or after
Officer Ahmad had returned from speaking with Plaintiff's wife, Plaintiff was informed that he
was being placed under arrest.
13.
The officers indicated to Plaintiff that they had to arrest him because the policies
under which they operated were, in their words, "really strict". The officers also discussed with
one another concerns about "liability."
14.
Officer Ahmad transported Plaintiff to Travis County Jail. Officer Murray
remained at the scene and conducted an extended follow-up interview with Plaintiff's wife.
3
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 4 of 23
15.
All interactions between Plaintiff and Officers Murray and Ahmad, as well as all
interactions between Plaintiff's wife and Officers Murray and Ahmad, were recorded on police
body cameras.
16.
Officer Ahmad executed a sworn probable cause affidavit that he and Officer
Murray prepared together, with Officer Murray supplying information for inclusion. This
affidavit was used to charge Plaintiff with a misdemeanor described therein as "Assault with
Injury Family Violence."
17.
The affidavit states that Plaintiff "did admit to hitting" his wife, that he "said that
she never used force against him" and that "both parties confirmed Markus was the only one
being physical."
18.
These statements in the affidavit are false. Plaintiff did not tell the officers that he
hit his wife, did not "admit" to doing so, did not say that she never used force against him, and
did not say that he was the only one being physical. The body cam footage reflects what Plaintiff
actually said, which is inconsistent with some of the statements attributed to him in the affidavit.
Among other things, Plaintiff told the officers that he did not hurt his wife and that there was no
violence from his wife during the incident.
19.
The affidavit also states that Plaintiff's wife "said she fell to the ground," that she
"said she developed a headache due to the arguing," and that she "had a complaint of pain due to
Markus physically assaulting" her.
20.
Upon information and belief, these statements are false or misleading due to
material omissions. Plaintiff's wife did not tell the officers that she fell to the ground. Both she
4
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed 06/02/25
Page 5 of 23
and Plaintiff independently told the officers that her headache was due to a cold. She tried to
convey to police that she did not experience pain other than from that headache. At one point,
she tried to clarify to police that "hit" was not an accurate description of what had occurred. The
body cam footage captures a full account of what she actually said.
21.
The affidavit completely omits Plaintiff's account of events that he gave to the
officers.
22.
The affidavit does correctly state that Plaintiff's wife "was not observed to have
physical injury".
23.
Plaintiff was imprisoned for three days. At some point, he was taken to a judicial
proceeding that he now understands to have been a magistration. Plaintiff had, prior to the
magistration, repeatedly requested opportunity to contact an attorney but was not given such
opportunity, so he had to participate in the magistration without counsel to assist him. The
probable cause affidavit was not presented to Plaintiff either prior to or during the proceeding.
Because he was not aware of the affidavit's existence or contents, Plaintiff could not alert the
magistrate that it contained false and misleading statements and material omissions. It was
therefore not possible for Plaintiff to request that the affidavit be scrutinized, compared to the
body cam footage, and corrected before being used to charge him.
24.
The magistrate informed Plaintiff that an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) was
being imposed and gave Plaintiff an oral summary of the order. Plaintiff was told to sign the
order but was not given an opportunity to review or read it, and was not provided with a copy.
5
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 6 of 23
25.
Plaintiff's prosecution lasted more than nine months, from June 2024 through the
end of March 2025. For the first five weeks, the EPO barred him from coming within 200 yards
of his home.
26.
Two days after Plaintiff's arrest, his wife visited the Travis County Attorney's
Office and spoke in person with a staff member. She explained that she had sustained no physical
injuries as a result of the incident and asked the staff member to observe that she had no visible
injuries.
27.
On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff's wife executed an affidavit of non-prosecution, which
Plaintiff's attorneys submitted to the prosecutor assigned to the case approximately ten days
later. In the affidavit, she stated in relevant part:
"During this incident I did not sustain any injuries and I did not experience any pain
whatsoever as a result of the incident. Markus did not physically hurt me. I was surprised
that Markus was arrested, and I objected to Markus' arrest. I did not intend for Markus to
be arrested when I called for police assistance and I specifically asked the officers on-
scene not to arrest him. I fear that my account of what happened was partly
misinterpreted by the Austin police."
She also stated in the affidavit:
"It is my wish that all charges in relation to this matter be dismissed, all protective orders
and bond conditions that prevent him from coming home be rescinded, and that no further
action be taken."
28.
On or about July 19, 2024, Plaintiff's wife spoke with the prosecutor assigned to
the case. She explained that she had not sustained any injuries or experienced any pain as a result
of the incident, clarified again that the headache mentioned in the arrest affidavit was due to a
cold, and expressed her wish that the case be dismissed. The prosecutor indicated that she was
inclined to dismiss the charges but stated that she first needed to review evidence.
6
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed 06/02/25
Page 7 of 23
29.
Throughout the prosecution, Plaintiff's wife continued to reach out to her point of
contact at the Travis County Attorney's Office, the same staff member she had initially spoken
with in person, to reiterate that she had not sustained any injury or experienced any pain as a
result of the incident.
30.
Plaintiff's attorneys requested discovery, including body cam videos, on or about
June 26, 2024. One such video was made available to them sometime between November 18 and
December 5, 2024. This video documented only a portion of the interactions between Plaintiff
and his wife and the Defendant officers. Plaintiff was informed that two additional videos existed
but that his attorneys were unable to access them due to technical issues. As of February 11,
2025, these videos had not yet been received.
31.
On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff's wife emailed her contact at the Travis County
Attorney's Office to ask whether she could view the body cam footage of her own interactions
with police. In response to that inquiry, the Travis County Attorney's Office indicated that the
remaining videos had now been made available to Plaintiff's attorneys, who shortly thereafter
confirmed receipt. These videos now showed all interactions between Plaintiff and the officers,
as well as all interactions between Plaintiff's wife and the officers.
32.
The first pretrial conference following disclosure of the full body cam footage was
scheduled for March 31, 2025. Plaintiff understood that the videos would be discussed at that
conference by his attorneys and the prosecutor. The charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on
that day.
7
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 8 of 23
II.
The City of Austin's Policies and Customs
33.
The City of Austin, acting through the APD, has policies and customs that direct
officers responding to incidents involving suspected family violence to omit, with reckless
disregard for the truth, information from probable cause affidavits that any reasonable person
would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to their attention, thereby violating the
rights of arrestees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
34.
Section 418.2.2 of the Austin Police Department General Orders (hereinafter, the
"General Orders") provides as follows:
"418.2.2 ARREST PC AFFIDAVITS FOR FAMILY VIOLENCE RELATED ASSAULTS
(a) Arrest affidavits for family violence assaults shall be limited to information that is
necessary to establish probable cause. Officers shall refrain from copying and pasting
their incident report into the arrest affidavit. It is not necessary to include the primary
aggressor's account of events within the arrest affidavit, unless such inclusion is
necessary to establish probable cause."
The term "primary aggressor" is defined in Section 418.1.1 of the General Orders as
"[t]he person who appears to be the most significant aggressor rather than the first
aggressor. In identifying the primary aggressor an officer shall consider:
(a) The intent of the law to protect victims of family violence from continuing
abuse,
(b) The threats creating fear of physical injury,
(c) The history of family violence between the persons involved, and
(d) Whether either person acted in self-defense."
35.
Section 418.2.2(a) requires that affidavits "shall be limited" to information
necessary to "establish" probable cause. This language directs police officers to omit from
affidavits any information that would tend to negate the existence of probable cause, as well as
any other information not strictly necessary to establish it - and it does so without exception,
8
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed
06/02/25
Page
9
of
23
even where a reasonable person would know that a magistrate would wish to have such
information brought to their attention, and where omission would constitute reckless disregard
for the truth. As such, the policy directs APD officers, whenever the information it requires them
to omit is material, to violate the constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
36.
Section 418.2.2(a) also states that "[i]t is not necessary to include the primary
aggressor's account of events within the arrest affidavit, unless such inclusion is necessary to
establish probable cause." This clause misinstructs officers that, once a person has been labeled a
"primary aggressor," the officer may, unless it supports probable cause, completely omit that
person's account from the affidavit. As such, the policy misstates officers' constitutional
obligations, which require officers to include in their affidavits information that a reasonable
person would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to their attention, or the omission
of which would constitute reckless disregard for the truth, regardless of whether the source has
been labeled a "primary aggressor." The City of Austin and the APD are deliberately indifferent
to the fact that officers trained under the APD's policy will predictably and routinely submit
affidavits that conceal material information from magistrates, resulting in violations of the
constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
37.
The requirement in Section 418.2.2(a) that officers omit information from
affidavits applies even where the omitted information would show that statements included in the
affidavit are false. Any reasonable person would know that a magistrate would wish to be alerted
to the falsity of material statements presented to them, so omissions of this type inevitably
constitute reckless disregard for the truth. By instructing officers to exclude information that
9
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 10 of 23
does not help establish probable cause - even when that information would have exposed false
or misleading statements included in the affidavit - the policy ensures that those statements
remain uncorrected and are used to charge arrestees, in violation of their constitutional due
process rights.
38.
Section 418.2.2(a) instructs officers to determine whose account of events may,
according to the APD's policies, be omitted from an affidavit by identifying a "primary
aggressor." The policy defines that term to mean "the most significant aggressor," not necessarily
the first, and directs officers to consider a set of subjective factors unrelated to whether a
person's account is credible, material, or trustworthy. It imposes no obligation on officers to
explain to the magistrate how the designation was made or what criteria were used. As a result,
the magistrate has no way to assess whether the omission of the person's account was based on
considerations such as credibility or materiality and, in fact, has no reason to believe that it was.
Because the criteria actually used in making the designation remain unreported and obscure, the
determination may in practice be arbitrary or reflect illicit bias. Yet under APD policy, that
designation - made without regard to credibility or materiality - will result by default in the
arrestee's account being omitted from the affidavit. That affidavit then becomes the basic
narrative presented to the magistrate, used to charge the arrestee, and likely to shape the direction
of the prosecution and legal process that follows.
39.
The APD, by instructing officers through Section 418.2.2(a) to manipulate which
information to include in affidavits in ways that will obviously and frequently result in material
information being concealed from magistrates, thereby communicates to officers that, in
10
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed
06/02/25
Page 11 of 23
connection with family violence allegations, it does not place value on officers preparing
affidavits that are not misleading. Indeed, Section 418.2.2(a) signals to officers that, in such
cases, they are at times expected to produce misleading affidavits, even when this violates the
constitutional rights of arrestees. The APD's message through this policy — that officers are
expected to sculpt affidavits that omit information that could lessen the likelihood of charges
even when such information is material and the affidavit thereby becomes misleading -
predictably leads not only to omission, but also to exaggeration and fabrication. The City of
Austin and the APD are deliberately indifferent to the fact that this policy will predictably result
in a pattern of misleading, exaggerated, and fabricated statements being included in affidavits,
and to the resulting violations of the constitutional due process rights of arrestees.
40.
By directing officers to omit from affidavits any information that does not help
establish probable cause - including facts that would negate it - Section 418.2.2(a) also
instructs officers how to assess probable cause in the first place. Officers understand that
affidavits must communicate all known material facts that a magistrate needs in order to
determine whether or not probable cause existed. Telling officers to always exclude facts that
would tend to negate the existence of probable cause from their communication to the magistrate
is to instruct them that such facts are not part of the probable cause determination - not for the
magistrate, and not for the officer - and should therefore not only be omitted from the affidavit
but also be disregarded by the officer in making their initial determination of probable cause at
the time of the arrest. As such, the APD's policy misinstructs officers by misconstruing their
constitutional obligations, which require officers to assess whether probable cause exists by
11
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 12 of 23
considering the totality of facts known to them, including those that cut against probable cause.
Section 418.2.2(a) will thus lead to arrests in situations where the totality of known facts does
not support the existence of probable cause, in violation of the constitutional rights of arrestees.
41.
In fact, there are situations in which APD policies require officers to make arrests
and file charges even when they correctly believe that the totality of facts known to them does
not support probable cause for the charge. Section 418.2.1 of the APD's General Orders reads as
follows:
"418.2.1 ARREST REQUIREMENT FOR ASSAULTIVE OFFENSES
(a) Officers are required to make an arrest for incidents involving family violence when:
1. An assault has occurred that resulted in a minimum of bodily injury or
complaint of pain; or where an officer can articulate facts from which a reasonable
person could infer that the victim would have felt pain due to:
(a) The manner in which the suspect made contact with the victim, or
(b) the nature of observable physical marks on the victim's body allegedly
caused by the suspect's contact with the victim, and
2. The suspect is still on-scene; and
3. The assault meets the definition of "family violence" or "dating violence."
42.
Section 418.2.1 requires arrests in situations where "an assault has occurred," but
it provides no guidance as to how officers are meant to determine whether this condition is met.
A reasonable officer trying to make sense of the policy will likely conclude that "an assault has
occurred" is shorthand for "there is probable cause to arrest for assault", and thus read Section
418.2.1 together with the APD's policies regarding probable cause in Section 418.2.2(a). As a
result, the officer will deploy the conception of probable cause communicated by Section
12
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed 06/02/25
Page 13 of 23
418.2.2(a), under which facts that would tend to negate probable cause are disregarded. The
officer will thus interpret the phrase "an assault has occurred" to mean that there exists some
basis to infer probable cause, such as the mere fact that an allegation has been made, while
disregarding any contrary facts known to them.
43.
Section 418.2.1, read together with Section 418.2.2(a), will at times require
officers to make arrests and file charges even when the officer believes that the totality of facts
known to them does not support probable cause for these charges. Consider for example a
situation in which a person who appears uninjured tells an officer that a suspect "hit" them, but
also says that it was not a "real" hitting and credibly communicates that they did not feel any
pain or sustain any injury. The officer may reasonably conclude - based on the person's own
account and their own observations — that no assault with injury occurred, and that the totality
of facts known to them does not support probable cause for that charge. Nonetheless, because
Section 418.2.2(a) directs the officer to disregard facts that would cut against probable cause
when making the probable cause determination, the officer must treat the incident as one in
which "an assault has occurred." And because, given that the word "hit" has been used, the
officer "can articulate facts from which a reasonable person could infer that the victim would
have felt pain due to [...] [t]he manner in which the suspect made contact with the victim,"
Section 418.2.1(a)(1) requires the officer to make an arrest.
44.
The officer is then instructed by Section 418.2.2(a) to omit from the arrest
affidavit any facts that do not help establish probable cause. As a result, although the officer
knows that the alleged victim did not feel pain, the officer will be required to exclude the facts -
13
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 14 of 23
such as the alleged victim's own statements - that form the basis for that knowledge. On the
other hand, the officer is instructed to include any "facts from which a reasonable person could
infer that the victim would have felt pain" because such facts tend to establish probable cause.
The affidavit will therefore present a version of events from which it could be concluded that the
victim experienced pain, while omitting the facts that the officer knows show that no pain
occurred. The result is an affidavit that supports an "assault with injury" charge. The arrestee will
therefore be charged with assault with injury, even though the arresting officer correctly believed
that the totality of facts known to them did not support probable cause for that charge, in
violation of the arrestee's constitutional rights. This unconstitutional outcome is a direct result of
the interplay between Section 418.2.1, which requires arrest, and Section 418.2.2(a), which
determines what facts will be included in the affidavit.
45.
A policy that requires officers to make arrests and file charges whenever they
determine - based on the totality of facts known to them - that probable cause for the charges
exists would not be constitutionally objectionable. But the City of Austin's policies do something
else. They direct officers to use, in cases that involve allegations of family violence, a modified
policy-driven conception of probable cause, one that instructs officers to disregard facts that
would cut against probable cause when making their probable cause determination and to omit
such facts from their arrest affidavits. Section 418.2.2(a) imposes this altered framework, and
Section 418.2.1 then requires arrests based on it.
46.
Adopting policies that supplant the constitutional conception of probable cause
with a modified conception of the City's own making is not permissible. The Constitution
14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 15 of 23
requires probable cause determinations in connection with warrantless arrests to be purely fact-
based undertakings to be made in light of the totality of known circumstances and informed by
the officer's experience and judgment. Municipalities may not modify this conception of
probable cause for certain categories of arrests based on policy considerations. By instructing
officers to apply an altered pre-scripted conception of probable cause for cases involving
allegations of family violence - one that is inconsistent with the totality-of-circumstances
framework required under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments - the City of Austin violates
the constitutional rights of arrestees.
47. Through Section 418.2.2(a), the APD communicates to its officers that, in
connection with cases involving allegations of family violence, it wants "probable cause" to
mean something different from what it means under the U.S. Constitution. The altered
framework sends a clear message that, in this category of cases, constitutional standards are
secondary to internal policy, which predictably leads to a broader range of constitutional
violations. Officers who are compelled to make arrests in situations where they believe that the
totality of known facts may not support probable cause will predictably feel pressed to justify
such arrests by drafting affidavits that distort the underlying facts. This predictably results in
affidavits that are misleading or contain material omissions, exaggerations, or outright
falsehoods, in direct violation of the constitutional rights of arrestees.
48. Upon information and belief, the City of Austin does not adequately train,
supervise, or discipline APD officers to ensure compliance with their constitutional obligations.
By failing to discipline officers who violate these obligations, the City ratifies such misconduct
15
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4
Page 16 of 23
and signals institutional acceptance. The City of Austin is deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional harms that predictably result.
49.
Upon information and belief, there are cases in which APD officers have stated
that they believed that under the APD's policies they had no choice but to make an arrest in
connection with an allegation of family violence, even when they did not believe that the alleged
assault had in fact occurred.
50.
Section 418 has, upon information and belief, been the grounds for multiple APD
disciplinary actions alleging non-compliance by APD officers. The risk of being subjected to
such disciplinary action places pressure on officers to follow Section 418 strictly, even when
doing so requires them to violate the constitutional rights of arrestees.
51.
Upon information and belief, charges relating to family violence are dismissed by
the Travis County Attorney's Office at a higher rate than other types of charges.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process
Through Fabrication of Evidence)
Against All Defendants
52.
Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.
53.
Officers Ahmad and Murray fabricated evidence by knowingly including material
false and misleading statements in the sworn probable cause affidavit used to charge Plaintiff,
16
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 17 of 23
and by omitting material information known to them that would have corrected, contradicted, or
contextualized those statements and prevented them from being misleading.
54.
In arresting Plaintiff and deciding what statements to include and what
information to omit from the arrest affidavit, the choices made by Officers Ahmad and Murray
were directed by their conscious attempt to conform their conduct to the policies and customs of
the APD, including Section 418 of the General Orders. This is evidenced by the officers'
statements to Plaintiff that they had to arrest him because the policies under which they were
operating were "really strict," and their discussions among themselves of "liability," which
Plaintiff understood as concern about liability for failing to comply with departmental policy. It
is further evidenced by the officers' complete omission of Plaintiff's account of events and other
material information that would have negated probable cause, in direct alignment with the APD's
instructions in Section 418.2.2(a), as well as by the affidavit's use of the conclusory phrase
"complaint of pain," which directly copies language from the APD's policy and suggests that the
policy was directly consulted during the drafting process.
55.
Officers are constitutionally required to include in arrest affidavits any material
information that a reasonable person would know a magistrate would wish to have brought to
their attention - especially when such information would reveal that a statement already
included in the affidavit is false or misleading. But Section 418.2.2(a) tells officers to do the
opposite: to omit information unless it helps establish probable cause, even when it would
correct a material falsehood or prevent the magistrate from being materially misled. That is
exactly what happened here: as directed by the APD's policy, the officers withheld information
17
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 18 of 23
that they knew would have exposed material errors and omissions in the affidavit used to charge
Plaintiff.
56.
As previously described, the APD's policy framework - including Sections
418.2.2(a) and 418.2.1 - not only directs officers to omit material information from affidavits,
but also predictably results in affidavits that include misleading statements, exaggerations, or
fabrications, as officers attempt to justify arrests that internal policy requires them to make and
the APD's written policies communicate to officers that, in cases involving allegations of family
violence, affidavits are not expected to be non-misleading. That is what occurred here. The
affidavit used to charge Plaintiff contains a number of misleading, conclusory, and false
statements which, as indicated by the one-sided nature of the omissions and distortions it
presents, are a predictable result of the APD's policies and customs.
57.
But for the City of Austin's policies and customs, the false and misleading
statements in Plaintiff's arrest affidavit would either not have been included, or would have been
accompanied by truthful information that would have exposed them as false or misleading. Had
that occurred, these statements could not have been used to charge and prosecute Plaintiff. The
City's unconstitutional policies, customs, and training were thus the proximate cause and moving
force behind the use of these false and misleading statements in Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution.
The City of Austin is therefore, together with the other Defendants, liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violating Plaintiff's clearly established rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
18
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed 06/02/25
Page 19 of 23
58.
Upon information and belief, the offense report in Plaintiff's case replicates all or
most of the false and misleading statements from the arrest affidavit.
59.
These false and misleading statements were used to deprive Plaintiff of liberty and
property by imprisoning Plaintiff for several days, imposing an EPO that barred him from his
home for over a month, and by prosecuting Plaintiff for over nine months. Had these false and
misleading statements not been used against Plaintiff, it is likely that one or more of the
following would have occurred: Plaintiff would not have been charged at all, his imprisonment
would have been shorter, no EPO would have been imposed or its duration would have been
shorter, and at a minimum the duration of his prosecution would have been significantly reduced.
60.
The false and misleading statements in the affidavit were of a kind that would
almost certainly have influenced a jury's verdict. The false claim that Plaintiff "did admit to
hitting" his wife attributes to him a statement that amounts, in both form and content, to a
confession. If this fabricated confession, combined with the other false and misleading
statements in the affidavit, had been introduced at trial, this would have significantly increased
the likelihood that a jury would have falsely convicted Plaintiff.
61.
The emotional distress that Plaintiff experienced as a result of his imprisonment
and prosecution was significantly exacerbated by the knowledge that the affidavit used to charge
him included material falsehoods and statements that were materially misleading. Their inclusion
signaled that, from the outset, the legal process instituted against Plaintiff would be
fundamentally dishonest. Until the body cam videos were made available, which took nearly
eight months, Plaintiff had to live with the likelihood that these statements would go uncorrected,
19
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 20 of 23
be replicated in other official documents, and be used at trial to secure a false conviction. He also
had to reckon with the possibility that additional fabrications might be introduced. This caused a
level of fear and distress that would not have existed had these false and misleading statements
not been used against him.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Defamation Plus Deprivation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process)
Against All Defendants
62.
Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations as if fully stated here.
63.
Defendant officers knowingly included in their probable cause affidavit the false
written statement that Plaintiff "did admit to hitting" his wife. This statement is of a kind that is
inherently harmful to reputation and as such constitutes defamation per se under general
principles of defamation law.
64.
Upon information and belief, the defamatory statement was replicated in the
offense report that the officer Defendants prepared in connection with Plaintiff's case. The
probable cause affidavit was provided to the magistrate and the prosecutor, and the offense report
was provided to the prosecutor.
65.
The affidavit containing the defamatory statement was published on the Travis
County District Clerk's website, where it remains publicly available and downloadable.
20
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 4
Filed
06/02/25
Page 21 of 23
Members of the public who search for Plaintiff's name online are easily able to find, access and
read the statement.
66.
The defamatory statement, both by itself and combined with the other false and
misleading assertions in the affidavit, has injured and continues to injure Plaintiff's reputation,
causing Plaintiff to incur damages.
67.
The defamatory statement was used, together with the other false and misleading
assertions in the affidavit, to charge and prosecute Plaintiff, depriving him of liberty and property
in violation of his constitutional rights as described above.
68.
As explained above, but for the City of Austin's policies and customs, the false
and misleading statements in Plaintiff's arrest affidavit - including the false claim that Plaintiff
"did admit to hitting" his wife - would either not have been included in the affidavit, or would
have been accompanied by truthful information that would have exposed them as false or
misleading. Had that occurred, these statements could not have injured Plaintiff's reputation or
been used to charge and prosecute him. The City's unconstitutional policies, customs, and
training were the proximate cause and moving force behind the publication of these false and
misleading statements and the resulting injury to Plaintiff's reputation, and their use in depriving
Plaintiff of liberty and property. The City of Austin is therefore, together with the other
Defendants, liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the defamation and the constitutional harms
Plaintiff experienced as a result of the publication and use of these false and misleading
statements, in violation of his clearly established rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
21
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 22 of 23
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Plaintiff seeks all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against all Defendants as follows:
a.
Awarding general and/or compensatory damages in an amount to be
determined at trial for all injuries suffered as a result of Defendants'
wrongdoing;
b.
Awarding punitive damages against the individual Defendants to the extent
permitted by law;
C.
Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum legal
rate;
d.
Awarding the costs of suit as incurred in this action and attorneys' fees;
and
e.
Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and
proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
22
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 4 Filed 06/02/25 Page 23 of 23
Date: June 2, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
Markus Glodek
Markus Glodek
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, CA 94121
Tel.: 737-999-1508
Email: mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
Plaintiff, Pro Se
23
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 5
Filed 07/16/25
Page 1 of 1
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
July 16, 2025
for the
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Texas
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BY:
DM
Markus Glodek
DEPUTY
)
Plaintiff
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00810
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad, and Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
To: Markus Glodek
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,
two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's
jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within
60 days from
06/11/2025
, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the
United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
Date:
06/27/2025
/s/Sara Schaefer
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
Paul Murray
Sara Schaefer- Attorney for Paul Murray
Printed name of party waiving service of summons
Printed name
City of Austin Law Department
P.O. Box 1546
Austin, TX 78767
Address
sara.schaefer@austintexas.gov.
E-mail address
(512) 974-1536
Telephone number
Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons
and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in
the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
"Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has
no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of
a summons or of service.
If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff
and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 6
Filed 07/16/25
Page 1 of 1
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED
for the
July 16, 2025
Western District of Texas- Austin
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Markus Glodek
)
BY:
DM
Plaintiff
DEPUTY
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00810-ADA
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad, Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
To: Markus Glodek
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,
two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's
jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within
60 days from
06/11/2025
, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the
United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
Date:
07/08/2025
/s/Sara Schaefer
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
Omer Ahmad
Sara Schaefer
Printed name of party waiving service of summons
Printed name
City of Austin Law Department
P.O. Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767
Address
sara.schaefer@austintexas.gov.
E-mail address
(512) 974-1536
Telephone number
Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons
and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in
the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
"Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has
no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of
a summons or of service.
If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff
and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.
Print
Save As...
Reset
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 7
Filed 07/16/25
Page 1 of 1
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED
for the
July 16, 2025
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Texas- Austin
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BY:
DM
Markus Glodek
)
DEPUTY
Plaintiff
)
V.
)
Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00810-ADA
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad, Paul Murray
)
Defendant
)
WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
To: Markus Glodek
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)
I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,
two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's
jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within
60 days from
06/11/2025
, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the
United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
Date:
07/08/2025
/s/Sara Schaefer
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
City of Austin
Sara Schaefer
Printed name of party waiving service of summons
Printed name
City of Austin Law Department
P.O. Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767
Address
sara.schaefer@austintexas.gov
E-mail address
(512) 974-1536
Telephone number
Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons
and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in
the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
"Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has
no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of
a summons or of service.
If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff
and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 1 of 14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
Markus Glodek,
Plaintiff,
V.
City of Austin, Omer Ahmad and Paul
Murray,
§ § § § § § § § § § § §
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00810-ADA
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND DEFENSES
TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:
The Defendants, City of Austin (sometimes hereinafter referred to as "the City" or
"COA"), Officer Omer Ahmad, and Officer Paul Murray, file this Answer and Affirmative
Defenses to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Defendants respectfully shows the Court the following:
ORIGINAL ANSWER
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b), the Defendants respond to each of the
specific averments in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as set forth below. To the extent that the
Defendants do not address a specific averment made by Plaintiff, the Defendants expressly deny
that averment.¹
PARTIES
1 Paragraph numbers in Defendants' Answer correspond to the paragraphs in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 8
Filed 08/11/25
Page 2 of 14
1.
Admitted. However, if evidence is developed that calls the alleged facts into question,
Defendants reserve the right to withdraw this admission in that Defendants are without sufficient
information to form a belief regarding the residence of Plaintiff.
2.
Admitted.
3.
Admitted.
4.
Admitted.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
5.
Admitted.
6.
Admitted.
7.
Admitted.
8.
Admitted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
Plaintiff's Arrest, Imprisonment and Prosecution
9.
Admitted.
10.
Denied as stated. One officer was present for the initial placement of handcuffs.
11.
Admitted.
12.
Admitted.
13.
Denied as stated. The officers did explain that Plaintiff was being arrested for using
physical force against his wife. Otherwise, the allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of
law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response
is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations
asserting fault or liability.
14.
Admitted.
15.
Admitted.
Page 2 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 8
Filed 08/11/25
Page 3 of 14
16.
Admitted.
17.
Admitted.
18.
Denied.
19.
Admitted.
20.
Denied.
21.
Denied.
22.
Denied as stated for incompleteness. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions
of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no
response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any
allegations asserting fault or liability.
23.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
24.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
Page 3 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 4 of 14
25.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
26.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
27.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
28.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
Page 4 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 5 of 14
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
29.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
30.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
31.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
32.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this
paragraph and it is noted that the allegations refer to events, actions, and non-parties or others,
which are not associated with these Defendants. The allegations of this paragraph state
Page 5 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 6 of 14
conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for
which no response is required as stated. To the extent any response is required, the Defendants
deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
II.
The City of Austin's Policies and Customs
33.
Denied.
34.
The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the extent
any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
35.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
36.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
37.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
38.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
39.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
Page 6 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 7 of 14
40.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
41.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
42.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
43.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
44.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
45.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
46.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
Page 7 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 8 of 14
47.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
48.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
49.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
50.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
51.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process
Through Fabrication of Evidence)
Against All Defendants
52.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
53.
Denied.
Page 8 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 9 of 14
54.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
55.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
56.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
57.
Denied.
58.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
59.
Denied.
60.
Denied.
61.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation of Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Defamation Plus Deprivation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process)
Against All Defendants
Page 9 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 10 of 14
62.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
63.
Denied.
64.
Denied.
65.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
66.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
67.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
68.
Denied. The allegations of this paragraph state conclusions of law or fact without stating
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for which no response is required as stated. To the
extent any response is required, the Defendants deny any allegations asserting fault or liability.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Denied.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Denied. All of the demands, including subparts a.,b.,c.,d.,e., are denied.
JURY DEMAND
Agreed.
Page 10 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 11 of 14
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES & IMMUNITIES
1.
Defendants deny any deprivation under color of statute, ordinance, custom, or abuses of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured to the Plaintiff by the United States Constitution,
state law, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq.
2.
Defendant Officers hereby invoke the doctrine of Qualified Immunity and Official
Immunity. Defendant Officers discharged their obligations and public duties in good faith, and
would show their actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information
possessed at that time.
3.
The incident in question and the alleged resulting harm to Plaintiff, if any, were caused or
contributed to by Plaintiff's own conduct. Pleading further and in the alternative, Plaintiff's
injuries and damages were caused in whole or in part by the conduct of other persons or entities
who are not currently parties to this lawsuit. Pleading further, alternatively, and by way of
affirmative defense, to the extent applicable and subject to being withdrawn, Defendants would
show that at the time and on the occasion in question, Plaintiff failed to use any degree of care or
caution that a person of ordinary prudence would have used under the same or similar
circumstances, and that such failure was a producing cause or the sole proximate cause of the
incident and alleged damages that arise therefrom.
4.
Defendants invoke the comparative responsibility provisions of the Texas Civil Practice
& Remedies Code.
5.
Defendants further plead that, in the unlikely event of being found to be liable, such
liability must be reduced by the percentage of the causation found to have resulted from the acts
or omissions of other persons.
6.
Defendants plead legal justification for each and every action taken.
Page 11 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 8
Filed 08/11/25
Page 12 of 14
7.
Defendants assert the limitations and protections of Chapters 41 & 101 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, and the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
8.
Defendants reserve the right to assert additional affirmative defenses throughout the
development of this case.
9.
To the extent Defendants did not address a specific averment made by Plaintiff,
Defendants expressly deny all such averments.
10.
Defendants assert the affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, if any,
and assert this failure to mitigate as both an affirmative defense and as a reduction in the alleged
damage amount, if any, due Plaintiff.
11.
Defendants assert the affirmative defense of statute of limitations as to all claims outside
the applicable limitations period(s), both statutory and administrative, if any.
12.
To the extent Defendants did not address a specific averment made by Plaintiff in the
Amended Complaint, Defendants expressly deny all such averments.
13.
Defendants reserve the right to assert additional affirmative defenses as may be
applicable throughout the development of the case, including immunity, estoppel, illegality,
laches, waiver, or any other matter which may constitute an avoidance or affirmative defense.
14.
Defendants assert that punitive damages are not available and would be contrary to the
protections of the United States Constitution by allowing a jury or fact finder standardless
discretion.
15.
Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against these defendants and the lawsuit
should be dismissed against them, individually.
16.
Defendant City of Austin asserts the affirmative defense of governmental immunity as
a municipal corporation entitled to immunity while acting in the performance of its governmental
Page 12 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 13 of 14
functions, absent express waiver.
17.
Defendant City of Austin asserts the affirmative defense of governmental immunity
since its employees are entitled to qualified/official immunity for actions taken in the course and
scope of their employment, absent express waiver.
18.
As a political subdivision, Defendant City of Austin denies that it can be liable for
exemplary/punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19.
If appropriate, and subject to withdrawal, Defendant[s] assert that Plaintiff's claim should
be dismissed, with all attorney's fees, other expenses and costs of this action taxed against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's claims are without substantial justification, frivolous, groundless in fact and
law, meritless, unnecessary, and vexatious.
DEFENDANTS' PRAYER
Defendants pray that all relief requested by Plaintiff be denied, that the Court dismiss this
case with prejudice, and that the Court award Defendants' costs and attorney's fees, and any
additional relief to which Defendants may be entitled under law or equity.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
DEBORAH THOMAS, CITY ATTORNEY
SARA SCHAEFER, ACTING CHIEF, LITIGATION
/s/ Monte L. Barton Jr.
MONTE L. BARTON JR.
State Bar No. 24115616
monte.barton@austintexas.gov
Assistant City Attorney
City of Austin
P.O. Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767-1546
Telephone (512) 974-2409
Facsimile (512) 974-1311
LEGAL COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
Page 13 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 8 Filed 08/11/25 Page 14 of 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 11th day of August 2025, I served a copy of Defendants' Answer and
Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on all parties in compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Via CM/ECF and EMail:
Markus Glodek
P.O. Box 210040
San Francisco, Ca 94121
Telephone: (737) 999-1508
Email: Mcgldk.contact@gmail.com
PRO SE PLAINTIFF
/s/ Monte L. Barton Jr.
Monte L. Barton Jr.
Page 14 of 14
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 1 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
MARKUS GLODEK,
Plaintiff,
V.
CIVIL NO. A-25-CV-810-ADA-ML
CITY OF AUSTIN, OMER AHMAD,
and PAUL MURRAY,
Defendants.
DOCKET CONTROL ORDER PURSUANT TO RULES 16(b) AND 26(f)
The above-styled matter is before the Court. 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
parties confer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and file with the Court, on
or before October 10, 2025, both a joint proposed scheduling and discovery plan
reflecting the Rule 26(f) criteria AND a completed version of the Court's standard
Scheduling Order. 2 The parties or their counsel shall confer, complete and prepare the form
with all dates (including the final pretrial conference, jury selection, and trial dates), obtain
the appropriate signatures, and file the proposed scheduling order. If there are no disputes,
the Court will enter the proposed scheduling order without the need for an initial pretrial
conference.
During the Rule 26(f) meeting, the parties or their counsel shall discuss the nature
and basis of their claims and defenses, the possibilities for prompt settlement or resolution
of the case, and the scope and type of discovery, including electronic discovery. The parties
1 This case has been referred to the undersigned in accordance with District Judge Alan D Albright's Magistrate
Referral Order, dated February 27, 2025. Consistent with his procedures, the undersigned enters this Order.
2 An example Scheduling Order may be found at Appendix A. Although the undersigned will enter the scheduling
order, the final pretrial conference, jury selection, and jury trial will take place before District Judge Alan D Albright,
unless the parties consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
1
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 2 of 7
shall also arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and develop their joint
proposed scheduling/discovery plan. These are the minimum requirements for the meeting.
The parties are encouraged to have a comprehensive discussion and are required to approach
the meeting cooperatively and in good faith. The discussion of claims and defenses shall be
a substantive, meaningful discussion. In addressing settlement or early resolution of the case,
the parties are required to explore the feasibility of ADR between themselves as well. If the
parties elect not to participate in an early ADR effort, the Court may nonetheless require a
settlement conference shortly before trial.
In addressing the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, the parties shall discuss the appropriate
timing, form, scope, or requirement of the initial disclosures, keeping in mind that
Rule 26(a)(1) contemplates that disclosures will be made by the date of the Rule 16(b) initial
scheduling conference and will include at least the categories of information listed in
the rule. Rule 26 affords the parties flexibility in the scope, form, and timing of disclosures
under both Rule 26(a)(1) (initial disclosures) and Rule 26(a)(2) (expert witness disclosures),
but the parties' agreement on disclosures is subject to approval by the undersigned. In their
discussion of disclosures, counsel shall address issues of relevance in detail, with each party
identifying what it needs and why. The discussion shall include the sequence and timing of
follow-up discovery, including whether that discovery should be conducted informally or
formally and whether it should be conducted in phases so as to prepare for filing of particular
motions or settlement discussions.
In addressing electronic discovery, the parties shall discuss what electronic sources
each party will search, difficulty of retrieval, preservation of records, the form of production
(electronic or hard-copy, format of production, inclusion of meta-data, etc.), cost of
2
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 3 of 7
production and which party will bear the cost, privilege/waiver issues, and any other
electronic discovery issues present in the case. Before engaging in the Rule 26 discussion,
the parties should determine who is most familiar with the client's computer system, what
electronic records the client maintains, how the client's electronic records are stored, the
difficulty/ease of retrieving various records, the existence and terms of the client's document
retention/destruction policy, and whether the client has placed a "litigation hold" preventing
destruction of potentially relevant records.
The undersigned recognizes Judge Albright typically resolves any discovery disputes
through an email practice. Because those discovery disputes have already been referred to
the undersigned by District Judge Alan D Albright's Magistrate Referral Order, the
undersigned directs the parties to follow typical motion practice prescribed by the Local and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring any discovery disputes before the Court.
The Court would also like to relay the following to the parties:
(1) The Court has recently faced a spate of discovery objections that do not track the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules. Please remember that boilerplate objections are
unacceptable.
(2) Speaking objections during depositions are improper. Other than to evaluate privilege
issues, counsel should not confer with a witness while a question is pending. Counsel may
confer with witnesses during breaks in a deposition without waiving any otherwise
applicable privilege.
(3) Parties shall promptly notify the Court if they reach a settlement in a case and request to
stay any deadlines.
SIGNED August 12, 2025.
MARK LANE
UNITED STATE ML JUDGE
3
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 4 of 7
APPENDIX A
1
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 5 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
§
§
§
Plaintiffs,
§
§
Case No.
V.
§
§
Jury Trial Demanded
§
§
Defendants.
§
JOINT PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER
Pursuant to Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court ORDERS that the
following schedule will govern deadlines up to and including the trial of this matter:
Date
Event
Discovery commences on all issues.
All motions to amend pleadings or to add parties shall be filed on or
before this date.
Fact Discovery Deadline. Any discovery requests must be propounded
so that the responses are due by this date.
The parties asserting claims for relief shall submit a written offer of
settlement to opposing parties on or before this date. All offers of
settlement are to be private, not filed, and the Court is not to be advised
of the same. The parties are further ORDERED to retain the written
offers of settlement and responses as the Court will use these in assessing
attorney's fees and court costs at the conclusion of trial.
Parties with burden of proof to designate Expert Witnesses and provide
their expert witness reports, to include all information required by Rule
26(a)(2)(B).
Each opposing party shall respond, in writing, to the written offer of
settlement made by the parties asserting claims for relief by this date. All
offers of settlement are to be private, not filed, and the Court is not to be
advised of the same. The parties are further ORDERED to retain the written
offers of settlement and responses as the Court will use these in assessing
attorney's fees and court costs at the conclusion of trial.
Parties shall designate Rebuttal Expert Witnesses on issues for which the
parties do not bear the burden of proof, and provide their expert witness
reports, to include all information required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
Expert Discovery Deadline. Expert discovery must be completed by this
date.
2
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML
Document 9
Filed 08/12/25
Page 6 of 7
Any objection to the reliability of an expert's proposed testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 shall be made by motion, specifically stating
the basis for the objection and identifying the objectionable testimony, not
later than 14 days of receipt of the written report of the expert's proposed
testimony or not later than 14 days of the expert's deposition, if a deposition
is taken, whichever is later. The failure to strictly comply with this
paragraph will be deemed a waiver of any objection that could have
been made pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
All dispositive motions shall be filed and served on all other parties on or
before this date and shall be limited to 20 pages. Responses shall be filed
and served on all other parties not later than 14 days after the service of the
motion and shall be limited to 20 pages. Any replies shall be filed and
served on all other parties not later than 7 days after the service of the
response and shall be limited to 10 pages, but the Court need not wait for
the reply before ruling on the motion.
Each party shall complete and file the "Notice Concerning Reference to
United States Magistrate Judge"
By this date the parties shall meet and confer to determine pre-trial
deadlines, including, inter alia, exchange of exhibit lists, designations of
and objections to deposition testimony, and exchange of demonstratives.
By this date the parties shall exchange a proposed jury charge and questions
for the jury. By this date the parties will also exchange draft Motions in
Limine to determine which may be agreed.
By this date the parties shall exchange any objections to the proposed jury
charge, with supporting explanation and citation of controlling law.
By this date the parties shall also submit to the Court their Motions in
Limine.
By this date the parties will submit to the Court their Joint Pre-Trial Order,
including the identification of issues to be tried, identification of witnesses,
trial schedule provisions, and all other pertinent information. By this date
the parties will also submit to the Court their oppositions to Motions in
Limine.
[This date should be
Final Pre-Trial Conference. The parties shall provide to the Court an agreed
a Friday, no less
jury charge with supported objections of each party, and proposed questions
than 90 days after the
for the jury, at the final Pre-Trial Conference.
dispositive motion
deadline.]
[This date should be
The Court will attempt to schedule Jury Selection on a day during the week
the week before
of
. Otherwise, Jury Selection shall begin at 9:00
trial.]
a.m. on,
.
[This date should be
Jury Trial Commences at 9:00 a.m. on Monday,
.
1-2 months after the
Final Pretrial
Conference date,
during the 1st or 3ʳᵈ
week of the month.]
3
Case 1:25-cv-00810-ADA-ML Document 9 Filed 08/12/25 Page 7 of 7
SIGNED
,
MARK LANE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
AGREED:
By:
By:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Attorneys for Defendants
4